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MODERN RACISM BUT OLD-FASHIONED IIED: HOW 
INCONGRUOUS INJURY STANDARDS DENY “THICK SKIN” 
PLAINTIFFS REDRESS FOR RACISM AND ETHNOVIOLENCE 
Hafsa S. Mansoor* 
“To be a Negro in this country and to be relatively conscious is to be in a 
rage almost all the time.”  -James Baldwin 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 4, 2000, Delois Turner wanted a donut and a cup of coffee.  
Ms. Turner, a fifty-seven year old Black woman from New York, entered 
Nancy Wong’s donut shop to purchase her pastry and beverage.1  
Unfortunately, the donut Wong gave Ms. Turner was stale, so Ms. Turner 
asked Wong for a fresher donut.2  Wong refused, insisting her donuts were 
baked fresh daily; Ms. Turner responded that she did not doubt that was the 
case, but her donut was nonetheless stale and refused to pay for the stale 
donut.3 
But, instead of providing Ms. Turner a fresher donut, Wong 
repeatedly called Ms. Turner a “black nigger from Philadelphia.”4  Wong 
then went on a tirade laden with racial invectives in front of the other shop 
patrons, all of whom were White.5  She railed, “you black niggers come in 
here, give me a hard time.  White people don’t give me a hard time.  White 
people nice people.”6  Wong threatened to call the police and demanded 
Ms. Turner “get out of [her] store.”7 
Ms. Turner reported the incident to the police, who charged Wong 
with an indictable bias crime and brought Wong in for processing that same 
day; while at the station being booked, Wong filed a complaint against Ms. 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Webster University.  
 1  Turner v. Wong, 832 A.2d 340, 345 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
 2  Id. at 346. 
 3  Id. 
 4  Id. 
 5  Id. 
 6  Id. 
 7  Wong, 832 A.2d at 346.  Wong ultimately did not call the police on Ms. Turner after 
Wong’s son stepped in to smooth things over, voided the donut, and asked Ms. Turner to 
just pay for the coffee, which she did.  Id. 
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Turner for theft of the donut.8  The county prosecutor dismissed the theft 
complaint against Ms. Turner; but the municipal judge convicted Wong of 
a petty disorderly offense of harassment and fined her $250, finding “that 
defendant had used the word ‘nigger’ several times in a loud voice and had 
accused black people of giving her a hard time, that defendant’s son even 
tried to quiet her down, and that the words were uttered intentionally to 
cause [Ms. Turner] alarm.”9 
Due to the incident that day, Ms. Turner was “embarrassed, shocked, 
mortified, hurt, angry and humiliated.”10  Further, “her self esteem had 
deteriorated and . . . she viewed herself differently.”11  For reasons 
unknown, Ms. Turner did not seek therapeutic or psychiatric treatment.12  
She did, however, bring suit against Wong for the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress (IIED).13  To establish a claim for IIED, Ms. 
Turner needed to show that “[1] the defendant acted intentionally or 
recklessly, both in doing the act and producing emotional distress; [2] the 
conduct was so outrageous in character and extreme in degree as to go 
beyond all bounds of decency; [3] the defendant’s actions were the 
proximate cause of the emotional distress; and [4] the distress suffered was 
so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.”14  Ms. 
Turner alleged in her suit that “proof of [her] humiliation, embarrassment 
and disbelief, caused by racial slurs, was sufficient to establish a prima 
facie case of [IIED].”15 
The court, however, dismissed her claim in summary judgment on the 
sole basis that Ms. Turner did not suffer “severe emotional distress,” and 
the appellate court affirmed the dismissal: Ms. Turner “merely claimed that 
she felt humiliated and mortified because of the racial insults,” and 
“humiliation and indignity . . . fall far short of sustaining a cause of action 
for the intentional tort.”16  The appellate court found that since Ms. Turner 
“offer[ed no] medical or expert proof to corroborate her feelings of lost 
self-esteem or anger,” and since her “claimed distress never manifested 
itself physically or objectively by way of headaches, loss of sleep, inability 
to perform her daily functions, or any condition that was professionally 
diagnosed,” there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the 
 
 8  Id. 
 9  Id. 
 10  Id. 
 11  Id. 
 12  Id. 
 13  Wong, 832 A.2d at 346. 
 14  Id. at 347 (citing Buckley v. Trenton Sav. Fund Soc’y, 544 A.2d 857, 863 (1988)). 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id. at 349. 
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sufficiency of Ms. Turner’s emotional distress.17  Ms. Turner was therefore 
entitled to no redress for the damaging racial epithets hurled against her. 
Many targets of racism and ethnoviolence, like Ms. Turner, seek 
redress in the courts—not merely to obtain compensatory damages for the 
physical, mental, and emotional injuries they suffer, but also as a 
vindication of their dignity and inherent humanity.  Many of these searches 
for compensation and vindication take the shape of IIED claims, as IIED is 
uniquely situated as a dignitary tort to redress the psychological and 
emotional harms of racism and ethnoviolence.  Unfortunately, however, 
while racism has evolved to remain insidiously vibrant in the modern 
United States, IIED law has not.  IIED law has not substantively changed in 
the last several decades, and for targets of racism and ethnoviolence like 
Ms. Turner, IIED’s antiquated nature can impede plaintiffs’ pursuit of 
redress.  Thus, while racism and its hateful ilk are not a phenomenon of 
antiquity—they are alive, thriving, and injuring people of color today18—
their targets are decreasingly able to seek recompense for their injuries in 
court through IIED suits. 
Recent psychiatric scholarship suggests IIED’s “severe emotional 
distress” injury standard can completely bar recovery in racism and 
ethnoviolence cases.  Many people of color, in response to decades of 
chronic racism, develop “thick skins.”  Consequently, they will not 
manifest the mental and emotional injuries of racist incidents in the “right 
way” to enable them to sue because their experiences do not fit within the 
rigid confines of pathological disorders.  The growing acceptance in the 
psychological community for reconceiving of the lasting trauma of chronic 
racism necessitates a consonant reevaluation of the legal IIED injury 
standard. 
 
 
 17  Id. 
 18  For instance, in 2016, there were 3,489 reported hate crime incidents motivated by 
race.  Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offenders by Bias Motivation, 2016, 2016 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2016/tables/table-1 (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2018).  This alarmingly high number is doubly troubling because even 
modest estimates contend less than a quarter of all incidences of racism or ethnoviolence are 
reported to any authority.  RICHARD T. SCHAEFER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RACE, ETHNICITY, AND 
SOCIETY 471 (2008).  Further, as of 2017, there are 954 hate groups in America, up from 
784 in 2014; from 2016 to 2017 there was a twenty-two percent increase in neo-Nazi hate 
groups alone; and anti-Muslim groups rose for a third straight year.  Hate Map, S. POVERTY 
L. CENT., https://www.splcenter.org/hate-map (last visited Sept. 13, 2018).  Additionally, in 
2017, there were 28,528 charges brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) for race discrimination, with an additional 3,240 on the basis of color; 
the statistics for race-based charges are consistent with the late 1990s, and those for color-
based charges have steadily increased over the last two decades.  Charge Statistics (Charges 
filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2017, U.S. EEOC, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Sept. 13, 2018). 
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This Comment proposes that new standard.  Part II reviews the 
development of IIED law and its historical use as a means of redress for 
racism and ethnoviolence; it also briefly sketches the arc of racial animus 
from old-fashioned to modern racism in order to better understand how 
IIED law has or has not evolved to respond to new realities.  Part III 
presents new theories evaluating the psychological and emotional toll of 
racism and ethnoviolence; it concentrates on literature chronicling the 
cumulative effect of chronic racism, comparing the injuries of racism 
against the symptomology of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and 
proposing a new theory that the injuries of racism produce a form of 
traumatic stress distinct from any other form of trauma.  Part IV analyzes 
the ways in which the existing IIED injury standard of “severe emotional 
distress” can work to the detriment of “thick skin” plaintiffs by failing to 
accommodate the unique injuries of chronic racism.  Part V proposes that 
incorporating race-based traumatic stress (RBTS) theory into the IIED 
injury standard in cases involving racism and ethnoviolence can serve to 
better provide plaintiffs redress by considering the harms of racism to 
provide a realistic injury standard.  Finally, Part VI considers the 
implications of including RBTS in an IIED injury evaluation, focusing 
particularly on the potentiality of a floodgates problem. 
Although this Comment solely focuses on plaintiffs’ issues satisfying 
the injury prong of racism- and ethnoviolence-based IIED claims, we 
cannot overlook that plaintiffs face several additional barriers to bringing a 
successful claim.  Extended consideration of these barriers is outside the 
scope of this Comment, but briefly acknowledging these structural 
impediments is valuable context.  Firstly, apart from the injury standard, 
scholars cite the outrageousness requirement as the greatest barrier to 
plaintiffs’ recovery;19 for targets of ethnoviolence, the outrageousness 
requirement can bar recovery because many jurisdictions have held racial 
harassment alone to be insufficiently atrocious or intolerable in a civilized 
society to be actionable as IIED.20  Additionally, the First Amendment can 
 
 19  See, e.g., Alexander Brown, Retheorizing Actionable Injuries in Civil Lawsuits 
Involving Targeted Hate Speech: Hate Speech as Degradation and Humiliation, 9 ALA. C.R 
& C.L. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2018); Camille A. Nelson, Considering Tortious Racism, 9 DEPAUL 
J. HEALTH CARE L. 905, 943–46 (2005); Dean M. Richardson, Racism: A Tort of Outrage, 
61 OR. L. REV. 267, 277–78 (1982). 
 20  E.g., Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 2d 217, 255 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(“New York courts have made it clear that the ‘use of religious, ethnic, or racial aspersions 
to denigrate a person . . . is not sufficiently egregious conduct to state a claim’ of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.” (quoting Graham ex rel. Graham v. Guilderland Cent. 
School Dist., 681 N.Y.S.2d 831, 832 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998))); Adams v. High Purity Sys., 
No. 1:09cv354, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80979, at *26–*28 (E.D. Va. July 2, 2009) (holding 
that racially disparaging remarks and termination motivated by race are conduct “clearly not 
outrageous or intolerable to state an IIED claim”); Jackson v. Lehigh Valley Physicians 
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bar recovery: when racism and ethnoviolence is expressed as racial slurs, 
verbal harassment, or cyber-attacks, defendants may try to avoid IIED 
liability by claiming their speech was protected.  Further, damages 
calculations can be an impediment.  For instance, some scholars query how 
liability ought to be imposed against a single defendant for injuries 
resulting from ethnoviolence when the plaintiff was particularly susceptible 
to such injury due to chronic racism; this question implicates potentially-
convoluted damages theories such as multiple causation, joint venture, and 
eggshell plaintiff.21  Although each of these impediments require more than 
this cursory mention to do them justice, recognizing the potential stumbling 
blocks of outrageousness, the First Amendment, and damages22 for a 
plaintiff’s claim illustrates the many gatekeepers of IIED beyond merely 
the injury standard. 
II. THE TORT OF OUTRAGE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF IIED AS REDRESS FOR 
RACISM AND ETHNOVIOLENCE 
The gravamen of an IIED injury is recompense for an affront to the 
plaintiff’s dignity.  Tort law strongly privileges claims for physical injuries 
over those for emotional injuries due to historical distrust of “pure” 
emotional distress claims (i.e., those without a predicate physical injury) as 
spurious and frivolous.23  IIED, as a dignitary tort, is the most significant 
 
Grp., No. 08-3043, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6936, at *300 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2009) (“‘Courts 
in this District have repeatedly found that racial discrimination alone does not meet the 
‘extreme and outrageous conduct’ standard necessary to state a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.’” (quoting Hargraves v. City of Philadelphia, No. 05-4759, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31951, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2007))).  But see Taylor v. 
Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 694–96 (1998) (holding that an employer’s reference to a Black 
employee as a “jungle bunny” could be sufficiently extreme and outrageous to form the 
basis of an IIED claim). 
 21  See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, 
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 168–70 (1982); Nelson, 
supra note 19, at 959. 
 22  It is also noteworthy that many scholars have expressed concern that the calculation 
of tort damages can reify institutional discrimination and replicate existing racial 
hierarchies; for instance, compensatory damages calculating expected lifetime earnings can 
produce gross disparities along racial lines, given women of color earn only a fraction of 
every dollar a similarly-situated white man makes.  While these disparities are already 
troubling in the everyday operation of tort liability, they are doubly reprehensible when 
race-disparate damages calculations are used as remedies for race-disparate treatment or 
harassment.  For a careful analysis of this issue, see MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. 
WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW (2010); Ronen 
Avraham & Kimberly Yuracko, Torts and Discrimination, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 661 (2017); 
Jennifer Wriggins, Damages in Tort Litigation: Thoughts on Race and Remedies, 1865-
2007, 27 REV. LITIG. 37 (2007). 
 23  See Russell Fraker, Reformulating Outrage: A Critical Analysis of the Problematic 
Tort of IIED, 61 VAND. L. REV. 983, 1001–05 (2008); Robert L. Rabin, Emotional Distress 
in Tort Law, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1197 (2009). 
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exception to this paradigm.24  Dignitary torts protect plaintiffs “against 
interferences with liberty and personal autonomy; protect[] against speech 
or conduct that embarrasses, humiliates, or shows blatant disrespect; and 
protect[] against communications that diminish the regard that others have 
for the plaintiff.”25  In an IIED claim, “[a]n actor who by extreme and 
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional 
harm to another is subject to liability for that emotional harm and, if the 
emotional harm causes bodily harm, also for the bodily harm.”26  Thus, 
IIED is a dignitary tort in that the defendant’s outrageous conduct inflicted 
emotional distress on the plaintiff which was “demeaning, contemptuous, 
or disrespectful”;27 and, by making conduct which “deeply call[s] into 
question the worth—the dignity—of the individual in question actionable 
as an IIED,”28 the tort protects plaintiffs’ “mental tranquility and peace of 
mind.”29 
Consequently, IIED, as a dignitary tort, is uniquely situated to redress 
racism and ethnoviolence because prejudice is, fundamentally, an assault 
on dignity.30  Admittedly, in its early days, IIED was principally used to 
protect “white racial privilege by allowing claims of white plaintiffs who 
alleged injury arising from contacts with blacks that they found 
objectionable”31 because the outrageousness element is inherently a 
 
 24  Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to 
Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2144 (2007). 
 25  Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, The Puzzle of Dignitary Torts, 104 
CORNELL L. REV. 319, 354 (2019). 
 26  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
 27  Abraham & White, supra note 25, at 356. 
 28  Id. at 377. 
 29  Catherine E. Smith, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: An Old Arrow 
Targets the New Head of the Hate Hydra, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 32 (2002). 
 30  Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 677 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“Any act of racism doubtless inflicts personal injury.  At its core, it is an act of violence—a 
denial of another’s right to equal dignity.”); see also Christopher A. Bracey, Dignity in Race 
Jurisprudence, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 669, 671 (2005) (“The struggle for racial justice in 
America . . . is perhaps best understood as a struggle to secure dignity in the face of 
sustained efforts to degrade and dishonor persons on the basis of color.  The concepts of 
dignity and subordination are powerfully linked.  The harm of racial subordination includes 
not only dignitary harms such as intentional and unintentional racist acts, but material 
injuries such as diminished health, wealth, income, employment and social status.  Racial 
subordination, however, takes place within and against a framework of dignity.  The 
creation, toleration, or defense of racially subordinating features of society—features that 
have the effect of entrenching second-class citizenship for members of such socially 
disfavored groups—are discretionary acts, and each of these discretionary acts rests upon 
perceptions of humanity and social worth, or dignity.”). 
 31  Chamallas, supra note 24, at 2115, 2167–68 (“During this period, the protection 
against racial insult or race-based humiliation was more likely to be afforded to white rather 
than minority plaintiffs. . . . On issues of race, tort law tended to reinforce white supremacy 
by providing white claimants damages for the ‘outrage’ of being treated with insufficient 
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normative determination based on the prevailing social mores of the time.32  
After the Civil Rights Era, though, IIED became prominent as a strategy 
for plaintiffs of color to seek compensation for racial harassment or 
violence.33  In 1964, James J. Brown and Carl L. Stern were the first to 
posit that IIED could remedy the psychological harms of racist hate 
speech.34  Dean M. Richardson expounded upon the proposal, advocating 
IIED torts could redress racial discrimination and harassment;35  and 
Richard Delgado36 and Mari Matsuda37 further popularized the strategy.  
The 1970s and ‘80s saw several successful recoveries for victims of racist 
incidents.38  Indeed, even Justice Marshall suggested in a 1974 Supreme 
Court opinion that IIED could be used to redress racial discrimination.39  In 
the last several decades, this strategy has become increasingly popular, and 
scholars have suggested IIED torts to provide remedy for prejudice in a 
 
deference by black attendants or for mistakenly being assigned to a ‘colored’ facility.”). 
 32  Chamallas, supra note 24, at 2125–26 (The definition of outrageousness within the 
meaning of an IIED claim “is extremely fluid and invariably responds to changing cultural 
sensibilities.”). 
 33  Chamallas, supra note 24, at 2121. 
 34  James Jay Brown & Carl L. Stern, Group Defamation in the U.S.A., 13 CLEV.-
MARSHALL L. REV. 7, 29–32 (1964) (proposing that IIEDs or their predecessor claims can 
provide redress for the “mental injury” and “emotional distress” of racially defamatory and 
derogatory public disparagement). 
 35  Richardson, supra note 19, at 267, 282. 
 36  Delgado, supra note 21, at 134 (proposing a new tort for racial insult that draws from 
the premise of IIED claims). 
 37  Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Hate Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2360–61 (1989) (drawing on Delgado’s tort, proposing a doctrinal 
shift away from First Amendment absolutism for hate speech due to its deleterious impact, 
and suggesting use of torts to combat “racist hate propaganda”). 
 38  Brown, supra note 19, at 7 (citing Wade v. Orange Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 844 F.2d 
951 (2d Cir. 1988) (involving a Black correctional officer suing for emotional distress and 
humiliation due to continued workplace racial harassment); Wilmington v. J.I. Case Co., 
793 F.2d 909, 911 (8th Cir. 1986) (involving a Black welder who suffered years of 
“discriminatory terms and conditions of employment because of his race” which ultimately 
culminated in his being intentionally fired because of his race); Wiggs v. Courshon, 355 F. 
Supp. 206, 206–11 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (involving a Black family suing for “mental anguish 
and emotional distress” after a restaurant waitress racially abused them, using the words 
“black son of a bitch” and “bunch of niggers,” in a dispute regarding a food order); Agarwal 
v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 63–64 (Cal. 1979) (involving a man of Indian descent suing for 
emotional distress when a supervisor called him a “black nigger” and a “member of an 
inferior race”); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach, Corp., 565 P.2d 1173, 1174 (Wash. 1977) 
(involving a Mexican American man suing his employer for humiliation and embarrassment 
due to coworkers’ racial jokes, slurs, and comments against him)). 
 39  Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 n.10 (1974) (“An action to redress racial 
discrimination may also be likened to an action for defamation or intentional infliction of 
mental distress. Indeed, the contours of the latter tort are still developing, and it has been 
suggested that ‘under the logic of the common law development of a law of insult and 
indignity, racial discrimination might be treated as a dignitary tort.’” (citing C. GREGORY & 
H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 961 (2d ed. 1969))). 
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variety of contexts.40 
Of course, the Civil Rights Era is also noteworthy as the moment in 
U.S. history when social attitudes toward racism shifted towards 
egalitarianism.  Rather than disappear, however, racism adapted to a subtler 
face.41  The evolution of racism is perhaps best exemplified by Lee 
Atwater’s (President Reagan’s campaign strategist’s) description of the 
GOP Southern Strategy: 
You start out in 1954 by saying, “Nigger, nigger, nigger.” By 
1968 you can’t say “nigger”—that hurts you, backfires. So you 
say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff, 
and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about cutting 
taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally 
economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt 
worse than whites . . . . You follow me—because obviously 
sitting around saying, “We want to cut this,” is much more 
abstract than even the busing thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more 
abstract than “Nigger, nigger.”42 
Although this shift away from overt racism is well-recognized in our 
collective recollection of history, it is worthwhile to briefly recognize here 
the extent of the change and the corresponding evolution of academic 
terminology surrounding race.  Racism is a “multilevel system of 
oppression based on the social categories of race whereby the superordinate 
group (traditionally whites in the United States) subordinates members of 
other racial groups using overt and covert methods.”43  Ethnoviolence is an 
 
 40  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 29 (redress for hate groups’ bias motivated cyber-attacks 
and online harassment); Meredith B. Stewart, Outrage in the Workplace: Using the Tort of 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress to Combat Employer Abuse of Immigrant 
Workers, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 187 (2010) (redress for exploitation of immigrant workers, 
such as wage theft, abuse and mistreatment, or substandard working conditions); Geri J. 
Yonover, Anti-Semitism and Holocaust Denial in the Academy: A Tort Remedy, 101 DICK. 
L. REV. 71 (1996) (redress for Holocaust denial); Aaron Goldstein, Note, Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress: Another Attempt at Eliminating Native American Mascots, 
3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 689 (2000) (to eliminate Native American mascots because, as a 
racist caricature, they are analogous to a racial epithet or racist harassment).  
 41  W. Carson Byrd, Conflating Apples and Oranges: Understanding Modern Forms of 
Racism, 5 SOC. COMPASS 1005, 1007 (2011); Christopher Tarman & David O. Sears, The 
Conceptualization and Measurement of Symbolic Racism, 67 J. POL. 731, 731–32 (2005). 
 42  Bob Herbert, Impossible, Ridiculous, Repugnant, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2005), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/06/opinion/impossible-ridiculous-repugnant.html. 
 43  Byrd, supra note 41, at 1008.  Racism exists at individual, institutional, and cultural 
levels.  Individual racism is interpersonal discrimination; for instance, perpetration of hate 
crimes against people of color or refusal to rent to an interracial couple.  DERALD WING SUE, 
MICROAGGRESSIONS IN DAILY LIFE 140–41 (2011).  Institutional racism resides in the 
policies and practices of governments, courts, businesses, schools, etc., to subordinate 
people of color and benefit white communities.  Id. at 141.  Although Black people are no 
longer legally considered three-fifths of a person, the “separate but equal” doctrine is no 
longer good law, Asians may own land, and Native Americans may now practice their 
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act motivated by group prejudice that aims to cause physical or 
psychological injury;44 it can include harassment, intimidation, vandalism, 
or physical attacks.45 
Racism and ethnoviolence still exist today, but their manifestations 
have changed from overt expressions (e.g., hate crimes, racial slurs, etc.) to 
more invisible and subtle ones, some of which even operate below the level 
of consciousness.46  This represents the transition from old-fashioned to 
modern racism.47  Old-fashioned racism—which defines people of color as 
biologically inferior and endorses explicit prejudice48—is decreasingly 
acceptable today due to generalized approval of egalitarianism.49  This is 
not to say hate crimes and overt racism are gone—indeed, Ms. Turner’s 
story was in 2005, and the United States has seen a sharp rise in hate 
crimes since the 2016 election50—but old-fashioned racism is now widely 
 
religions, institutional racism continues in disproportionate incarceration rates, 
discriminatory bank lending practices, racial profiling, environmental racism that allows 
factories to pollute minority neighborhoods while preserving the purity of wealthier White 
neighborhoods, de facto housing segregation, and so on.  Id.  Finally, cultural racism “is the 
overarching umbrella under which both individual and institutional racism flourish”: 
cultural racism venerates and propagates a worldview in which one group’s cultural 
heritage—White Western Europeans’—is superior to all others.’ resulting in the imposition 
of those “superior” cultural standards upon other groups.  Id.  Thus, cultural racism is how 
the legacy of Manifest Destiny became a preference for individualism, capitalism, 
Christianity, the English language, and Eurocentric beauty standards, all of which persists to 
this day.  Id. 
 44  RICHARD T. SCHAEFER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RACE, ETHNICITY, AND SOCIETY 470 
(2008). 
 45  Id.  Although this definition resembles definitions of hate crimes, social scientists 
prefer the term ethnoviolence because it is broader: hate crimes have specific legal and 
statutory definitions, but by divorcing ethnoviolence from those criminological nuances, 
“ethnoviolence” more directly and simply connects the interpersonal violence it references 
with race and ethnic relations.  Id. at 471. 
 46  SUE, supra note 43, at 8–9. 
 47  SUE, supra note 43, at 142–43. 
 48  Tarman & Sears, supra note 41, at 737. 
 49  Bertram Gawronski, Paula M. Brochu, Rajees Sritharan & Fritz Strack, Cognitive 
Consistency in Prejudice-Related Belief Systems: Integrating Old-Fashioned, Modern, 
Aversive, and Implicit Forms of Prejudice, in COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY: A FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLE IN SOCIAL COGNITION 369, 369–71 (Bertram Gawronski & Fritz Strack eds., 
2012). 
 50  Rachel Janik, Hate Crimes Are Up in Major U.S. Cities for the Fourth Year in a 
Row, Study Says, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (July 5, 2018), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2 
018/07/05/hate-crimes-are-major-us-cities-fourth-year-row-study-says; Richard Cohen, 
Hate Crimes Rise for Second Straight Year; Anti-Muslim Violence Soars Amid President 
Trump’s Xenophobic Rhetoric, S. POVERTY LAW CTR. (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.splcent 
er.org/news/2017/11/13/hate-crimes-rise-second-straight-year-anti-muslim-violence-soars-
amid-president-trumps; Aaron Williams, Hate Crimes Rose the Day After Trump Was 
Elected, FBI Data Show, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/n 
ews/post-nation/wp/2018/03/23/hate-crimes-rose-the-day-after-trump-was-elected-fbi-data-
show/?utm_term=.26bcbe61bfb4. 
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condemned as “illegal, immoral, and contrary to the democratic ideals we 
hold.”51  Comparatively, modern racism operates “in such a manner as to 
preserve the nonprejudiced self-image of Whites by offering them 
convenient rationalizations for their actions.”52  Modern racists 
wholeheartedly espouse egalitarianism, sympathize with victims of past 
racial injustice, and believe they are non-prejudiced; yet, they harbor 
unconscious negative beliefs and feelings towards people of color.53 
One form of modern racism especially relevant here is 
microaggressions.  Microaggressions are “the brief and commonplace daily 
verbal, behavioral, and environmental indignities . . . that communicate 
hostile, derogatory, or negative . . . slights and insults to the target person 
or group.”54  They include microinsults (which demean the victim’s racial 
heritage through stereotypes or insensitivity, often centering around themes 
such as ascribing victims a lack of intelligence, treating them as second-
class citizens or lesser persons, pathologizing the values and 
communication styles of people of color as abnormal, and/or presuming 
they are criminal or dangerous because of their race) and 
microinvalidations (which exclude, negate, or nullify the thoughts, feelings, 
or experienced realities of people of color).55  Microaggressions are 
emblematic of modern racism in that the communicator does not 
necessarily consciously intend to perpetuate racism because that would 
contradict their non-racist self-image, but their targets still decisively suffer 
the psychological and emotional toll of the expressed racism. 
III. THE HARM OF RACISM AND ETHNOVIOLENCE 
Since at least Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, the law has 
recognized the psychological and emotional injury of racism.56  But, even 
then, the law was nearly a decade behind the findings it was recognizing.  
And this lumbering pace of recognition has continued so that modern 
understandings of racism and ethnoviolence have yet to see their reflections 
 
 51  SUE, supra note 43, at 141. 
 52  SUE, supra note 43, at 145. 
 53  John F. Dovidio, Samuel L. Gartner, Adam R. Pearson, Chris G. Sibley & Fiona 
Kate Barlow, Aversive Racism and Contemporary Bias, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 267, 270–71 (Chris G. Sibley & Fiona Kate Barlow eds., 
2016). 
 54  SUE, supra note 43, at 5. 
 55  SUE, supra note 43, at 31, 35–39. 
 56  347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (citing a number of empirical psychological studies on the 
detrimental impact of segregation and finding that “[t]o separate [children of color in grade 
and high schools] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race 
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone”). 
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in the law.  Microaggressions, for instance, were first studied in 197057 and 
became part of the academic mainstream in the 2000s;58 as of late 2018, 
however, only four cases have ever, even cursorily, used the term 
“microaggression”—all in the last three years and none to evaluate whether 
a plaintiff suffered a cognizable injury.59 
The scientific community has a fuller history of recognizing the 
physiological, psychological, and emotional impact of racism.  
Psychologists have found exposure to racist incidents60 heightens 
physiological reactivity—such as increased heart rate or blood pressure61—
leading to hypertension, coronary heart disease, diabetes, asthma, 
allergies,62 coronary artery calcification, increases in body max index 
(BMI), giving birth to lower weight infants,63 and a depressed immune 
system consequently more susceptible to microbial disease.64  The 
cumulative effect of racism’s chronic stress also directly contributes to 
 
 57  SUE, supra note 43, at xvi. 
 58  Scott O. Lilienfeld, Microaggressions: Strong Claims, Inadequate Evidence, 12 
PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 138, 141 (2017). 
 59  Kulikowski v. Payscale, No. 18-cv-00702-MSK-MEH, 2018 WL 3209109, at *1 (D. 
Colo. June 29, 2018) (involving an employee suing under multiple civil rights acts for post-
traumatic stress disorder she alleges was caused by a “microaggression” in a leadership 
training workshop at work); Vejo v. Portland Pub. Schs., 204 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1161 (D. 
Or. 2016) (involving a challenge to an expert witness’s qualifications to testify on the 
impact of microaggressions on the plaintiff), Gadling-Cole v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of 
Ala., No. 2:12-CV-2882-SLB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127161, at *52 n.27 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 
23, 2015) (involving a professor suing her former employer for allegedly discriminating 
against her, including engaging in racial microaggressions); Kiani v. Huha, No. A18-0157, 
2018 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 873, at *10–12 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2018) (involving a 
plaintiff appealing the lower court’s denial of her relief on the basis that the judge below 
was biased and engaged in ethnicity-based microaggressions against her). 
 60  Racist incidents are “cognitive/affective assaults on one’s ethnic self-identification.  
These assaults can be verbal attacks, physical attacks, or threats to livelihood . . . . The 
assaults can be sudden or systematic, intentional or unintentional, or overt or ambiguous and 
can be perpetrated by an individual (individual racism) or institution (institutional racism) or 
by cultural hegemony (cultural racism).”  Thema Bryant-Davis & Carlota Ocampo, Racist 
Incident-Based Trauma, 33 COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 479, 480 (2005) (citations omitted). 
 61  Jules P. Harrell, Sadiki Hall & James Taliaferro, Physiological Responses to Racism 
and Discrimination: An Assessment of the Evidence, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 243 (2003). 
 62  SUE, supra note 43, at 97–98.  See also Laura Smart Richman, Jolynn Pek, Elizabeth 
Pascoe & Daniel J. Bauer, The Effects of Perceived Discrimination on Ambulatory Blood 
Pressure and Affective Responses to Interpersonal Stress Modeled Over 24 Hours, 29 
HEALTH PSYCHOL. 403, 403, 408 (2010) (finding that individuals who experienced more 
chronic racial discrimination had more negative daily affect, higher levels of depression and 
anxiety, and cardiovascular dysregulation putting them at risk for hypertension and coronary 
heart disease). 
 63  Robert T. Carter & Thomas D. Scheuermann, Legal and Policy Standards for 
Addressing Workplace Racism, 12 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 1, 9–10 
(2012). 
 64  Nelson, supra note 19, at 927. 
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depression and anxiety; “diminishes the quality of life; lowers life 
satisfaction, happiness, and self-esteem; increases cultural mistrust, 
feelings of alienation, anxiety, and feelings of loss, helplessness, 
[paranoia,] and racial rage; and may result in fatigue and exhaustion.”65 
Further, not only is there widespread consensus that hate crimes can 
severely traumatize victims to produce PTSD and other DSM disorders, 
there is also growing consensus that a lifetime of microaggressions—a 
lifetime of the quintessential expressions of modern racism—can have an 
equally detrimental impact.66  Some research even suggests 
microaggressions are more distressing than ordinary stressors because (1) 
microaggressions occur more frequently and tend to last longer while 
ordinary stressors are time-limited, and (2) microaggressions are more 
potent because they are symbols of historic oppression and are often 
ambiguous where ordinary stressors are easily traceable to a root cause.67  
In other words, even where one microaggression has minimal effect, the 
cumulative impact of a lifetime of microaggressions can be destructive 
enough to produce the same sort of traumatic stress as a hate crime. 68  
Thus, reactions to both racial micro- and macroaggressions can include 
trauma symptoms such as flashbacks and nightmares, loss of memory and 
concentration, depression, anxiety, hypervigilance, trouble sleeping, 
decreased appetite, irritability, gambling problems or substance abuse, and 
isolation.69  Indeed, some studies find nearly three-quarters of people who 
face racial discrimination have lasting psychological effects, many of 
which are consistent with trauma reactions.70 
A. Racist Incidents and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
Many scholars in the early 2000s advocated to conceptualize racist 
incidents as a form of trauma71 in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
 
 65  SUE, supra note 43, at 99–100, 149. 
 66  SUE, supra note 43, at 91–93. 
 67  SUE, supra note 43, at 96. 
 68  SUE, supra note 43, at 6–7, 51, 150. 
 69  Wahiba M. Abu-Ras & Zulema E. Suarez, Muslim Men and Women’s Perception of 
Discrimination, Hate Crimes, and PTSD Symptoms Post 9/11, 15 TRAUMATOLOGY 48, 49 
(2009); Bonnie Lee, Peter Kellett, Kamal Seghal & Corina Van den Berg, Breaking the 
Silence of Racism Injuries, 14 INT’L J. MIGRATION, HEALTH & SOC. CARE 1, 6 (2018) 
(citations omitted).  For further analysis of the physiological, psychological, and emotional 
harms of racism, see THE COST OF RACISM FOR PEOPLE OF COLOR (Alvin N. Alvarez, 
Christopher T. H. Liang & Helen A. Neville, eds., 2016). 
 70  Carter & Scheuermann, supra note 63, at 14 (citations omitted).  
 71  “Although trauma is a form of stress, it is distinct in that it is a more severe form of 
stress understood in terms of both the nature of the stressor(s) and the type of reaction to the 
stressor(s).”  Robert T. Carter, Racism and Psychological and Emotional Injury: 
Recognizing and Assessing Race-Based Traumatic Stress, 35 COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 
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Mental Disorders (DSM; the comprehensive codification of all formally 
recognized psychological disorders), namely through expanding the 
definition of PTSD.  In the most recent edition of the DSM, the DSM-5, 
PTSD is caused by “exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, 
or sexual violence.”72  PTSD leads to intrusion symptoms (e.g., flashbacks, 
nightmares, and/or intrusive and recurrent memories of the traumatic 
event(s)), as well as avoidance of stimuli associated with the traumatic 
event(s) and negative changes in cognition and mood related to the 
traumatic event(s) (e.g., difficulty remembering the event, self-blame or 
self-loathing, diminished interest in significant activities, inability to 
experience positive emotions, feelings of detachment and estrangement, or 
persistent fear, horror, anger, guilt, shame, or other negative emotional 
states).73  PTSD also manifests in “marked alterations in arousal and 
reactivity associated with the traumatic event(s) . . . as evidenced by” (1) 
“irritable behavior and angry outbursts (with little or no provocation)”; (2) 
“reckless or self-destructive behavior”; (3) “hypervigilance”; (4) 
“exaggerated startle response”; (5) “problems with concentration”; and/or 
(6) “sleep disturbance (e.g., difficulty falling or staying asleep or restless 
sleep).”74  Thus, many of the aforementioned psychological and 
physiological sequalae of racism naturally very closely mimic the 
symptomology of PTSD.  Indeed, a growing body of psychological 
scholarship documents “a robust link” between racism and trauma, 
including a substantial amount which conceptualizes racism as trauma and 
suggests the link may be causational, not merely correlational.75 
 
13, 19 (2007). 
 72  AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 271 (5th ed. 2013).  PTSD can be caused by directly experiencing the traumatic 
event, witnessing the same in person, learning that the same happened to a close family 
member or friend, or “experiencing repeated or extreme exposure to aversive details of the 
traumatic event(s) (e.g., first responders collecting human remains; police officers 
repeatedly exposed to details of child abuse).” 
 73  Id. at 271–72. 
 74  Id. at 272. 
 75  Terrence A. Jordan II, Experiences of Racism and Race-Based Traumatic Stress 10, 
13–21 (Aug. 8, 2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgia State University), 
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cps_diss/125.  See also Cheryl Curie, T. Cameron Wild, 
Donald Schopflocher & Lory Laing, Racial Discrimination, Post-Traumatic Stress and 
Prescription Drug Problems Among Aboriginal Canadians, 106 CANADIAN J. PUB. HEALTH 
382, 386 (2015) (“This study . . . documents a positive association between racism 
experienced in the past year and PTSD symptoms experienced in the past month that could 
not be explained by other events such as childhood separation from parents, abuse in 
childhood and exposure to poverty over the life course.  In mediation models, PTSD 
symptoms explained the association between racial discrimination and prescription drug 
problems among Aboriginal adults; general psychological stress and distress did not . . . . A 
model that may be derived from these findings posits that racial discrimination results in 
states of distress and suffering consistent with PTSD symptoms . . . .”). 
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To strengthen the case that racism and ethnoviolence can produce 
PTSD symptoms, psychologists often draw parallels between the lasting 
impact of racist incident-based trauma and of accepted sources of PTSD.  
For instance, scholars note that both racist incidents and childhood sexual 
abuse, sexual harassment, or rape produce in the victim feelings of shock, 
betrayal, and powerlessness; a sense that they are “not good enough”; a 
long-lasting difficulty trusting themself or others; a distrust and resultant 
numbing of their emotions; and difficulty discussing the trauma.76 
Additional parallels can be drawn between the trauma of racism and 
rape.  Both racists and rapists justify their behaviors through the 
perpetuation of myths that their victims are lesser.77  Both produce injuries 
that are cognitive (e.g., difficulty remembering and concentrating), 
emotional (e.g., anger, self-blame, and distrust), and psychological (e.g., 
depression and anxiety) and impact victims’ ability to have healthy 
relationships.78  Survivors of both use denial as a protective mechanism79 
and may experience shock, numbness, or dissociation during or after the 
abuse which prevents them from speaking up, responding, or asking for 
help; and this temporary paralysis can also lead to self-blame, shame, or 
self-loathing if survivors consider their inability to defend themselves the 
cause of the abuse.80 
Parallels can also be drawn between racist incidents and domestic 
violence.  Both manifest as multi-event violations over time, where the 
termination of one incident does not necessarily establish safety, and a 
significant likelihood of another violation in the near future produces 
hyperarousal and anxiety, even though the timing and details of that future 
violation are indeterminable.81  Survivors of both racism and domestic 
violence often experience feelings of “shame, self-blame, powerlessness, 
fear, and confusion.”82  Society tells survivors of both that if they had just 
been nicer, avoided certain situations or people, said or done the right 
things, or otherwise modified their behavior, they would not have suffered 
the abuse.83  Perpetrators of both justify their abuse by claiming their 
 
 76  Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, supra note 60, at 486–87. 
 77  People of color are deemed uncivilized, criminal, and untrustworthy; rape survivors 
are accused of being liars, teasers, and untrustworthy.  Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, supra note 
60, at 487. 
 78  Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, supra note 60, at 487–88. 
 79  Denial for rape survivors may sound like “maybe he didn’t hear me say no,” or “at a 
certain point men can’t stop”; for targets of racism, it may be outright denial that 
discrimination even occurred.  Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, supra note 60, at 488.  
 80  Id. 
 81  Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, supra note 60, at 492. 
 82  Id. 
 83  Id. 
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victim deserved it (whether by burning the food, flirting, or arriving home 
late in the case of domestic violence; or in the case of racism, acting 
dangerously or suspiciously so that the racist was allegedly protecting 
themself or others by their abuse).84  And society responds to both forms of 
abuse with heavy doses of victim-blaming, saying that survivors of 
domestic violence should “just leave” rather than “choosing” to stay and 
that people of color should “lift themselves up by their bootstraps.”85 
Thus, identifying these parallels—and the resulting similarities in the 
psychological and emotional scars suffered—scholars advocated the 
definition of PTSD ought to be broadened to better encompass the injuries 
of racism.  But they were met with significant resistance.  Foundationally, 
the psychological community has traditionally disfavored expanding 
definitions of mental disorders for fear of diluting the meaning of a 
diagnosis or demoting the status of legitimate victims; even the inclusion of 
domestic violence and sexual assault in PTSD (which had previously been 
limited almost exclusively to war-related trauma) came only after extensive 
lobbying and advocacy.86  Consequently, the DSM continues to define 
trauma as originating only from incidents that could have caused physical 
injury or death to oneself or others, and still excludes traumatic symptoms 
from verbal or emotional abuse, denial of resources, or social alienation.87  
Additionally, some may find it problematic that recognizing racist incidents 
as trauma could have direct implications on perpetrator accountability 
(particularly financially as compensatory damages)88 and on victims who 
may be stigmatized if racism is pathologized as trauma.89  Because of these 
barriers, modern racism remains largely outside the scope of PTSD.90 
 
 84  Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, supra note 60, at 493. 
 85  Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, supra note 60, at 493–94. 
 86  Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, supra note 60, at 485. 
 87  Id. 
 88  Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, supra note 60, at 485–86. 
 89  Id. at 486. 
 90  Robert T. Carter & Jessica M. Forsyth, A Guide to the Forensic Assessment of Race-
Based Traumatic Stress Reactions, 37 AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 28, 36–37 (2009); 
Monnica T. Williams et al., Cultural Adaptations of Prolonged Exposure Therapy for 
Treatment and Prevention of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in African Americans, 4 BEHAV. 
SCI. 102, 103 (2014).  Under the DSM-5 definition of PTSD and its potential origins, PTSD 
can result from racism or ethnoviolence in the form of a direct cataclysmic event which 
threatens the victim’s bodily safety with death or serious injury because of their racial or 
ethnic identity group or in the form of vicarious cataclysmic events (e.g., witnessing a direct 
cataclysmic event against another member of one’s racial or ethnic identity group.  Janet E. 
Helms, Guerda Nicolas & Carlton E. Green, Racism and Ethnoviolence as Trauma, 18 
TRAUMATOLOGY 65, 68 (2012).  Excluded from that list, however, are the ambiguous 
microaggressions which sap mental energy and produce chronic fear, vigilance, or paranoia 
but do not produce the sort of threat of physical injury necessary to permit a PTSD 
diagnosis.  See supra notes 65–70 and accompanying text. 
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B. Racist Incidents and Race-Based Traumatic Stress 
In response to the torpid evolution of the DSM, some scholars have 
proposed an entirely new theory to understand the injury of racism and 
ethnoviolence.  Most notable is Robert T. Carter’s race-based traumatic 
stress theory.  Carter first proposed the theory in 2007 as a non-
pathological model of the psychological distress resulting from racism and 
discrimination in order to aid counseling and psychological assessments,91 
though he also had an eye to its forensic applications—namely, evaluating 
psychological distress and emotional damages in legal claims, particularly 
federal civil rights cases.92  Thus, rather than mental health professionals 
diagnosing targets of racism with depression, anxiety, acute stress 
reactions, or other generalized diagnostic categories of psychological stress 
not specific to racism, Carter sought to develop a framework to understand 
“the unique aspects of racial experience” so mental health professionals can 
“know how to manage the emotional and psychological effects [of racist 
experiences] and how these effects may be manifested.”93 
Carter conducted a meta-analysis of dozens of studies which 
demonstrated the high rate at which people of color experience racial 
discrimination and the extent to which it is a stressor producing 
physiological arousal and psychological and emotional distress.94  Notably, 
Carter identified a well-established correlation between race and trauma 
whereby, when exposed to the same trauma, people of color developed 
higher rates of PTSD than their White counterparts,95 suggesting racism 
itself is a stressor.96  Further, Carter notes there are few stress models which 
adequately consider an individual’s race or culture,97 and he posits that part 
of the difficulty may be that racism neither wholly falls within the category 
of stress from “everyday events” nor the category of “extraordinary and 
more severe” stress from uncommon events.98  Accordingly, he concludes 
racism has deeper psychological and emotional ramifications than merely 
 
 91  Carter, supra note 71. 
 92  Robert T. Carter, Clarification and Purpose of the Race-Based Traumatic Stress 
Injury Model, 35 COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 144, 145 (2007). 
 93  Id. at 146. 
 94  Carter, supra note 71, at 42–57.  Particularly notable: a 2005 study of 323 people of 
color’s experiences of racial discrimination which found that 89% of participants reported 
racist encounters, and 74% had “lasting psychological and emotional effects, many of which 
reflected traumatic reactions.”  Id. at 43–44 (citing Robert T. Carter, Jessica Forsyth, Silvia 
Mazzula & Bryant Williams, Racial Discrimination and Race-Based Traumatic Stress, in 
HANDBOOK OF RACIAL-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY & COUNSELING 447 (Robert T. Carter, ed., 
Vol. 2, 2002)). 
 95  Carter, supra note 71, at 38–41. 
 96  Carter, supra note 71, at 73. 
 97  Carter, supra note 71, at 28–31. 
 98  Carter, supra note 71, at 30–31. 
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ordinary stress, but the rigid restrictions of PTSD are too narrow to 
appropriately address racism.99 
Instead, Carter proposes that traumatic stress provides the best 
framework to understand the harms of racism.  Traumatic stress was 
developed in 1997 to expand the range of traumatic events to those which 
are psychologically and emotionally threatening, even when not physically 
threatening; and it considers the cumulative effect of a lifetime of traumatic 
events rather than only the immediate effects of isolated incidents.100  For 
an incident to produce traumatic stress, it must be (1) perceived as negative 
(causing emotional pain); (2) experienced as sudden; and (3) experienced 
as uncontrollable.101  The core reactions associated with traumatic stress are 
avoidance or psychic numbing (e.g., avoiding thoughts, feelings, places, or 
people related to the event); intrusion or reexperiencing (e.g., intrusive 
thoughts and memories of the event, flashbacks and nightmares); and 
arousal or hyperactivity (e.g., hypervigilance, difficulty concentrating, 
irritability, anger or rage, sleeplessness, etc.).102 
Using this traumatic stress framework, Carter concluded that racism 
produces “psychological and emotional pain or injury [that] is part of a 
nonpathological process and set of reactions that have associated with them 
symptom clusters and reactions that can impair a person’s functioning”: 
RBTS.103  Racism—whether manifesting as the denial of access to certain 
services or opportunities, as physical or verbal assaults or stereotyping, or 
as workplace isolation and denial of promotions—can produce a traumatic 
stress injury by which the victim experiences the event as negative, sudden, 
and uncontrollable, and has symptom manifestations of avoidance, 
intrusion, and arousal.104  Thus, racism can produce traumatic stress which 
manifests as “anxiety, anger, rage, depression, compromised self-esteem, 
shame, . . . guilt, . . . irritability, hostility, poor social and interpersonal 
relationships, lack of trust in people, self-blame, or various combinations of 
all these reactions”105—symptoms which directly align the aforementioned 
empirically-shown harms of racism with the essential definition of 
traumatic stress.  Additionally, Carter expressly noted chronic stress can 
 
 99  Carter, supra note 71, at 33.  For instance, a PTSD diagnosis requires a traumatic 
incident that created a threat of death or serious physical injury, but racism and other forms 
of emotional abuse often fall outside those parameters.  Robert T. Carter & Carrie Muchow, 
Construct Validity of the Race-Based Traumatic Stress Symptom Scale and Tests of 
Measurement Equivalence, 9 PYSCHOL. TRAUMA 688, 688 (2017). 
 100  Carter, supra note 71, at 34. 
 101  Carter, supra note 71, at 34–35. 
 102  Carter, supra note 71, at 36. 
 103  Carter, supra note 71, at 83. 
 104  Carter, supra note 71, at 84, 90. 
 105  Carter, supra note 71, at 90, 92. 
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produce trauma where “a ‘last straw[‘] encounter or experience . . . 
increases the level of stress to the threshold of trauma.”106  Thus, the 
“severity” of a racist incident is not the overtness or potential lethality of 
the racism encountered therein, but the “strength and intensity of the 
person’s reaction and the symptom cluster that emerges” therefrom, 
meaning even microaggressions can produce traumatic stress.107 
In 2013, Carter published a standard to “recognize and assess [RBTS] 
reactions,” the Race-Based Traumatic Stress Symptom Scale (RBTSSS).108  
Developed over five years, the RBTSSS was the first instrument to 
specifically assess racism-related trauma.109  It measures RBTS resulting 
from specific encounters with racism and discrimination in which victims 
answer a series of yes or no statements to identify if they perceived the 
specific incident as negative, sudden, and uncontrollable (i.e. whether the 
incident could qualify as a stressor for traumatic stress) and the extent to 
which victims experienced symptoms of traumatic stress (namely, 
depression, intrusion, anger, hypervigilance, physiological arousal, low 
self-esteem, and avoidance or dissociation).110  For RBTS to exist, the 
experience must have been negative, sudden, and uncontrollable; and the 
individual must report the presence of at least two of the three reactions 
demonstrating the presence of traumatic stress (i.e. arousal/hypervigilance, 
intrusion/reexperiencing, and avoidance/numbing).111  Carter has since 
demonstrated the potential for use of the RBTSSS in clinical settings as a 
means of evaluating emotional pain based on “whether, and to what extent, 
the client was affected by [a racist incident], and [the] treatment or . . . 
evaluation [needed] to assist the person to relieve the experienced 
stress.”112  Further, in subsequent empirical studies, Carter and others have 
affirmed the validity of the RBTSSS.113 
IV. MODERN RACISM BUT OLD-FASHIONED IIEDS 
The Third Restatement of Torts intentionally sets the injury standard 
of severe emotional distress very high to prevent plaintiffs from bringing 
 
 106  Carter, supra note 71, at 84. 
 107  Carter, supra note 71, at 88–90. 
 108  Robert T. Carter et al., Initial Development of the Race-Based Traumatic Stress 
Symptom Scale: Assessing the Emotional Impact of Racism, 5 PSYCHOL. TRAUMA 1, 2 
(2013). 
 109  Carter & Muchow, supra note 99, at 693. 
 110  Carter & Muchow, supra note 99 at 689. 
 111  Robert T. Carter & Sinéad M. Sant-Barket, Assessment of the Impact of Racial 
Discrimination and Racism: How to Use the Race-Based Traumatic Stress Symptom Scale 
in Practice, 21 TRAUMATOLOGY 32, 33 (2015) (internal citations omitted). 
 112  Id. at 38. 
 113  Carter & Muchow, supra note 99, at 689, 694. 
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IIED suits for mere inconveniences; in practice, however, the standard is so 
high it operates as a nearly-complete bar to even genuinely severely injured 
plaintiffs.  The Restatement reads: “complete emotional tranquility is 
seldom attainable in this world, and some degree of emotional harm, even 
significant harm, is part of the price of living in a complex and interactive 
society.”114  Thus, “as a matter of policy, even if emotional harm is 
inflicted for no purpose other than to cause such harm, some degree of 
emotional harm must be expected in social interaction and tolerated 
without legal recourse.”115  The severe emotional distress requirement 
consequently makes it so that “the law intervenes only where distress 
inflicted is so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to 
endure it.”116  A diagnosed DSM disorder, like PTSD, is in many ways a 
paradigmatic IIED injury; indeed, some jurisdictions like Tennessee 
expressly counsel that “[e]vidence that the plaintiff sought medical 
treatment [and] was diagnosed with a medical or psychiatric disorder such 
as post-traumatic stress disorder” should “inform the analysis and [is] 
pertinent to support a plaintiff’s claim that he or she has suffered a serious 
mental injury.”117 
In many jurisdictions, however, this sets the bar for “severe emotional 
distress” so high that even deeply emotionally-harmed plaintiffs are unable 
to satisfy it, often resulting in the dismissal of their suit at summary 
judgment.  For instance, Iowa has held “evidence that [the] plaintiff was so 
angry he felt physical pain, was sleepless, could only think about the event, 
felt cheated by the legal system and did not trust lawyers or anyone else, 
was haunted by fears that occupied his waking moments, interrupted his 
sleep, and prevented him from enjoying life” was insufficient to establish a 
claim of emotional distress.118  Iowa has also held that an event that was the 
“‘worst thing’ that ever happened to [the] plaintiff” and which produced 
confusion and upset the plaintiff “fell far short” of the proof necessary for a 
prima facie case;119 that a plaintiff who “‘quivered’ when the subject came 
up” had shown insufficiently severe emotional distress;120 and that a 
plaintiff who “suffered destruction of his career and reputation in the 
community, anxiety and high blood pressure requiring medication, 
nightmares, headaches, dizziness, and loss of enthusiasm” suffered only 
 
 114  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46. 
 115  Id. 
 116  Id. (quoting cmt. j). 
 117  Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 209–10 (Tenn. 2012). 
 118  Rouse v. Farmers State Bank, 866 F. Supp. 1191, 1218 (N.D. Iowa 1994) (citing 
Bates v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 467 N.W.2d 255, 261 (Iowa 1991)). 
 119  Id. at 1218 (citing Tappe v. Iowa Methodist Medical Ctr., 477 N.W.2d 396, 404 
(Iowa 1991)). 
 120  Id. (citing Bethards v. Shivvers, Inc., 355 N.W.2d 39, 44–45 (Iowa 1984)). 
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symptoms which were “uncomfortable or disconcerting, [but] not ‘so 
severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it.’”121  
Similarly, New Jersey found that a plaintiff who was nauseous, upset, and 
hysterical; suffered from depression; had nightmares; and “no longer 
enjoy[ed] her activities the way she used to” lacked “distress . . . [rising] to 
the required threshold level” because she still played bingo, had friends, 
and tried to keep herself busy, meaning that, by law, she lacked a “dramatic 
impact on her every-day activities or on her ability to function daily.”122  
Minnesota has held a plaintiff’s symptoms of “insomnia, crying spells, a 
fear of answering the door and telephone, and depression necessitating 
treatment [were] not sufficiently severe.”123  Illinois has held that neither 
feeling “‘fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation and worry,’” nor feeling 
“appalled, annoyed, aggravated, disgusted, offended, upset, embarrassed, 
uncomfortable, belittled and self-conscious” was severe emotional distress 
within the meaning of IIED.124  Furthermore, Nevada has held that a 
plaintiff who “had ‘great difficulty in eating, sleeping, and [who] suffer[ed] 
outward manifestations of stress and [was] generally uncomfortable’” did 
not have severe emotional distress125 and that “feelings of inferiority, 
headaches, irritability, and loss of ten pounds are insufficient evidence of 
distress as a matter of law.”126  Additionally—perhaps even more troubling 
for plaintiffs than the litany of symptoms they are evidently expected to be 
able to endure—are some courts’ sweeping pronouncements that distress 
must be entirely debilitating in order to be actionable: New Jersey, for 
instance, requires emotional distress be “disabling” to be considered 
sufficiently severe to support an IIED claim,127 and Minnesota has stated 
that any distress of the type “people commonly encounter and endure in 
their lives” should not so much as be submitted to a jury. 128 
 
 121  Rouse, 866 F. Supp. at 1218–19 (emphasis added). 
 122  Lascurain v. City of Newark, 793 A.2d 731, 748–49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2002). 
 123  Jensen v. Walsh, 609 N.W.2d 251, 254 (Minn. App. 2000), rev’d on other grounds 
623 N.W.2d 247 (Minn. 2001) (citing Elstrom v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 270, 533 
N.W.2d 51, 57 (Minn. App. 1995)). 
 124  Cheatham v. City of Chi., No. 16 C 3015, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76440, at *19–20 
(N.D. Ill. May 7, 2018) (first citing Lovi v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 62 F. Supp. 3d 756, 
769 (N.D. Ill. 2014); and then citing Ponticello v. Amark Unif. & Career Apparel Servs., 
Inc., No. 05 C 1137, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66977, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2006)). 
 125  Igbinovia v. Catholic Healthcare West, No. 2:07-cv-01170-RCJ-PAL, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 144702, at *15 (D. Nev. March 4, 2010) (citing Churchill v. Barach, 863 F. 
Supp. 1266, 1276 (D. Nev. 1994)). 
 126  Id. (citing Alam v. Reno Hilton Corp., 819 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D. Nev. 1993) 
(emphasis added)).  
 127  Sweeten v. Middle Twp., No. 04-3512, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92186, at *38 (D. 
N.J. Dec. 14, 2007). 
 128  Lee v. Metropolitan Airport Com., 428 N.W.2d 815, 823 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) 
MANSOOR (DO NOT DELETE) 12/17/2019  5:55 PM 
2020] COMMENT 901 
To the extent, then, that racism is a daily occurrence to which people 
of color become too accustomed to directly react, scholars worry the 
requirement that IIED plaintiffs suffer emotional distress that is so 
“disabling” and uncommon that it hinders them from carrying out daily 
activities effectively bars “thick skin” plaintiffs—who do not find even 
outrageous racial abuse to be debilitating—from justice.129  Consider, for 
instance, a particularly telling illustration Dean M. Richardson used to 
demonstrate how too high an injury standard for racial harassment may act 
as a complete bar to recovery.  Two Black Harvard students search together 
for an apartment; one comes from a more privileged background and was 
“raised by his refined, wealthy family to recognize his intelligence and his 
responsibility to be a leader,” and the other “was raised in poverty and has 
had to struggle against insurmountable odds” all his life.130  During the 
search, they encounter an explicitly racist landlord who refuses to “rent to 
‘niggers,’” “curses them with gutter language, warns them against renting 
in his neighborhood if they value their necks, and slams the door in their 
faces.”131  The wealthy student is outraged and physically trembles for 
hours in internalized rage.132  But, the poor student “has lived through so 
many similar encounters that this incident touches him only slightly.”133  
That is, the poor student, as a result of chronic exposure to virulent bigotry, 
has too thick of skin to manifest severe emotional distress.134  This mirrors 
the case of Ms. Delores Turner, who suffered sincere psychological distress 
but no “inability to perform her daily functions” and was consequently 
denied redress.135 
Additionally, little legal literature exists which specifically examines 
the psychological effects of racism, and many jurisdictions strenuously 
 
(citing Cafferty v. Garcia’s of Scottsdale, Inc., 375 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1985)). 
 129  E.g., Robert T. Carter, Jessica M. Forsyth, Bryant Williams & Silvia L. Mazzula, 
Does Racism Predict Psychological Harm or Injury? Mental Health and Legal Implications, 
7 LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVE F. 131, 139 (2007); Nelson, supra note 19, at 945–46; 
John T. Nockleby, Hate Speech in Context: The Case of Verbal Threats, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 
653, 694–97 (1994); Richardson, supra note 19, at 270–75.  See also Carter & Forsyth, 
supra note 90, at 30-31 (2009) (noting that courts are wary of allowing plaintiffs to prevail 
on racial harassment claims unless they were exposed to “particularly severe and overt 
racial discrimination or harassment,” which has made it particularly difficult for victims to 
seek legal redress, especially in modern times when overt discrimination is less common 
than subtle or microaggressive racism). 
 130  Richardson, supra note 19, at 270–71. 
 131  Id.  
 132  Richardson, supra note 19, at 271. 
 133  Id. 
 134  Richardson, supra note 19, at 275. 
 135  See supra text accompanying notes 10–17. 
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emphasize only diagnosed mental disorders as a sufficient injury.136  
Consider again the case of Ms. Turner: her mortification, anger, and 
humiliation137 were in many ways paradigmatic, prototypical reactions to 
racist incidents which wholly fit into the trauma or traumatic stress 
framework;138 however she was denied legal relief on the basis she had an 
insufficient injury.139  The court focused in part on the fact that she sought 
no professional medical, psychiatric, or therapeutic treatment and therefore 
could not prove “any condition that was professionally diagnosed.”140  But, 
because her encounter with Wong did not threaten death or serious physical 
injury,141 even if Ms. Turner had sought treatment, it is unlikely she could 
have obtained a DSM diagnosis.142  And she consequently still would have 
been denied relief under the extremely high bar of “severe emotional 
distress.”143  This heavy-handed preference for pathological diagnoses 
disadvantages plaintiff targets of racism and ethnoviolence, since 
“psychological reactions to racial discrimination often do not fit criteria for 
disorders in the [DSM.]”144  Furthermore, the DSM definition of trauma 
offers no conceptualization of cumulative stress—the sine qua non of a 
“thick skin” plaintiff—even though racism has been empirically shown to 
produce trauma reactions through exposure to more subtle, insidious 
discrimination over prolonged periods.145  Thus, judicial reliance on such a 
diagnosis is thoroughly inapposite: plaintiffs have equally deep 
psychological wounds (i.e. trauma reactions) but because that distress does 
not manifest in the “right way” (i.e. does not fit within the restrictive 
confines of a DSM definition), they are denied relief. 
In other words, the injury standard was intentionally drafted as 
difficult to satisfy to prevent frivolous and fraudulent claims, but it now 
acts to the detriment of genuine, legitimately-injured plaintiffs with bona 
fide claims because of its artificially high requirements.146  The standard of 
severe emotional distress is already incredibly high (arguably unnecessarily 
 
 136  Carter et al., supra note 129, at 139, 147. 
 137  See supra text accompanying notes 10–11. 
 138  See supra notes 65, 74–85, 103–107 and accompanying text. 
 139  See supra text accompanying notes 16–17. 
 140  See supra text accompanying notes 12, 17. 
 141  See supra text accompanying notes 4–9. 
 142  See supra text accompanying notes 72–74. 
 143  See supra text accompanying notes 118–128. 
 144  Carter & Forsyth, supra note 90, at 29. 
 145  See supra notes 66–85 and accompanying text. 
 146  Indeed, some studies suggest that as many as eighty percent of plaintiffs in racial 
discrimination cases do not prevail; and of the mere twenty percent of claims that are 
successful, the plaintiffs were subject to blatant and egregious racial animus, which was 
often physical and occurred over prolonged periods.  Carter & Forsyth, supra note 90, at 30 
(internal citations omitted). 
MANSOOR (DO NOT DELETE) 12/17/2019  5:55 PM 
2020] COMMENT 903 
so), but the fact that DSM trauma definitions are largely incongruous with 
the harms of racism and ethnoviolence makes the standard, practically 
speaking, unattainable for too many plaintiffs.  Thus, alternate 
conceptualizations of racism-related harm are needed to permit legal 
relief.147  Further, given that “racism [is] a unique type of life stressor,” this 
alternate conceptualization of cognizable racism-related injuries should 
particularly respond to this uniqueness.148 
V. REMEDYING THE INJURY STANDARD IN RACISM- AND  
ETHNOVIOLENCE-BASED IIEDS 
A rich history of scholarship exists drawing upon critical race theories 
and social sciences research on the harms of racism to advocate for 
widespread legal reform;149 and, to a slightly lesser extent, that history is 
also visible in legal precedent.150  For racism- and ethnoviolence-based 
 
 147  Carter et al., supra note 129, at 147. 
 148  Carter & Muchow, supra note 99, at 688. 
 149  See, e.g., Brown, supra note 19 (proposing new injury standards of degradation and 
humiliation as measures of emotional distress resulting from racially-motivated hate 
speech); Carter & Scheuermann, supra note 63 (using research on RBTS to highlight the 
importance of legal redress for workplace racial harassment, identify flaws in the current 
system, and propose a new legal framework to hold employers liable for workplace 
harassment which produces race-based traumatic stress); Delgado, supra note 21 
(chronicling the mental and emotional harms of racial stigmatization to propose a new tort 
of racial insult); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (drawing on cognitive psychology 
to propose government action motivated by unconscious racism, even if not intentional 
racial discrimination, should trigger strict scrutiny); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the 
Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803 (2004) (identifying the 
empirically-discovered harms of racial stigmatization and proposing a new constitutional 
test to determine if a new law produces a risk of stigmatic harm, therefore necessitating 
strict scrutiny); Nelson, supra note 19 (identifying adverse mental, emotional, and physical 
health effects of racism and evaluating the how intentional torts and the eggshell skull rule 
may adopt a critical race theory lens to better provide redress to victims of racial abuse); 
Nockleby, supra note 129 (proposing a new tort of racial intimidation to remedy the 
emotional and psychological harm of victims threatened with violence motivated by racial 
animosity). 
 150  For example, Kenneth Clark’s research on the impact of racial segregation on Black 
children was foundational in the NAACP’s brief in Brown v. Board of Educ. and was even 
cited to in the ultimate Supreme Court opinion to overturn the doctrine of “separate but 
equal.”  Ludy T. Benjamin, Jr. & Ellen M. Crouse, The American Psychological 
Association’s Response to Brown v. Board of Education, 57 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 38, 39–41 
(2002); see also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (citing seven 
psychology studies on the effect of racial prejudice and segregation on children, including 
Kenneth Clark’s research).  Consider also not-yet-Supreme-Court-Justice Louis D. 
Brandeis’s landmark brief in Muller v. Oregon which drew on statistical studies, public 
health reports, and social science research to argue against invalidating a law instituting 
maximum work hours for women working in factories and laundries; it was one of the first 
briefs to draw more upon science and social science research than legal citations and was so 
influential an advocacy tool that “Brandeis Brief” is now the shorthand for legal briefs 
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IIEDs, two scholars have used this methodology to advocate for prominent 
tort reforms.  The most well-known is Richard Delgado’s 1982 proposal for 
a tort of racial insult.151  Delgado began by chronicling the harms of racial 
stigmatization: internalized degradation and humiliation, shame, and self-
loathing and the subsequent exacerbated rates of substance abuse, 
hypertension, and negative psychosomatic outcomes among people of 
color.152  He then argued racial insults are even more damaging than other 
forms of verbal abuse because they rely on “the unalterable fact of the 
victim’s race and on the history of slavery and race discrimination in this 
country.”153  He noted racial insults are inherently “dignitary affront[s]” 
because they “express[] a judgment that the victim of the racial slur is 
entitled to less than that to which all other citizens are entitled,”154 so the 
dignitary tort of IIED may be suitable to redress racial insults; but, he 
worried the tort’s injury standard makes it a flawed response.155  
Consequently, Delgado proposed a tort of racial insult, actionable when a 
plaintiff proves “[l]anguage was addressed to him or her by the defendant 
[1] that was intended to demean through reference to race; [2] that the 
plaintiff understood as intended to demean through reference to race; and 
[3] that a reasonable person would recognize as a racial insult.”156  Delgado 
admitted the new tort may have minimal impact on the incidence of racism; 
but he posited that making racial insults financially costly can shift social 
norms to decrease bigotry by threatening to make it too expensive for most; 
and, to the extent that legality confers a benediction of morality, making 
racial insults tortious suggests the conduct is immoral and contrary to the 
public conscience.157  Although in the decades since Delgado first proposed 
the tort it has not been accepted as a cause of action, the article in which he 
proposed it has been cited in a handful of court opinions, the most notable 
of which is a 1998 New Jersey Supreme Court opinion which relied on it to 
sustain an IIED claim based on a single racial slur against summary 
judgment.158 
 
 
emphasizing social science or economic statistics in their arguments.  Clyde Spillenger, 
Revenge of the Triple Negative: A Note on the Brandeis Brief in Muller v. Oregon, 22 
CONST. COMMENT. 5, 5–6 (2005); see also Brandeis Brief, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/Brandeis%20brief (last visited Oct. 18, 2018).   
 151  Delgado, supra note 21. 
 152  Delgado, supra note 21, at 136–39. 
 153  Delgado, supra note 21, at 143–44. 
 154  Id. 
 155  Delgado, supra note 21, at 152, 154–55. 
 156  Delgado, supra note 21, at 179. 
 157  Delgado, supra note 21, at 148–49. 
 158  Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 694–700 (N.J. 1998). 
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More recently, Alexander Brown has proposed new injury 
standards—degradation and humiliation—to measure IIED injuries.159  
Like Delgado, Brown centered how racial insults violate and deny victims’ 
dignity.160  He, too, considered IIED torts inadequate due to their 
sometimes insurmountable outrageousness and injury requirements.161  
Brown therefore proposed a test for degradation to conceptualize racism’s 
dignitary affront162 and a test for the higher injury of humiliation to use 
when a plaintiff’s degradation is publicized.163  Brown has received mixed 
reactions in academia164 but no attention to date from a court. 
Thus, while these proposals may remedy deficiencies in IIED law if 
adopted, another theory is needed to meanwhile bridge the gap between the 
IIED “severe emotional distress” standard and the injury actually suffered 
 
 159  Brown, supra note 19, at 42. 
 160  Brown, supra note 19, at 12–13.  Brown defines dignity to include one’s internal 
sense of worth and value as a human being, others’ recognition of that worth, and one’s 
status as a full and equal member of society.  Brown, supra note 19, at 15–16, 24. 
 161  Brown, supra note 19, at 7–8. 
 162  The degradation test is: (1) “[t]he defendant intentionally judged as inferior or else 
denied the plaintiff’s basic worth (as a human being) or their civic status, or both,” including 
use of a racial slur; (2) “[t]he degrading performed in (1) was allied to the fact that the 
defendant had the authority or standing to judge as inferior or deny the plaintiff’s basic 
worth (as a human being), their civic status, or both,” including through a formal grant of 
power like the status of a judge or employer or an implicit grant through the silence of 
others; (3) “[t]he plaintiff had a feeling or sense that they were being degraded, and this was 
as a direct result of the degrading performed in (1) and (2)”; and (4) “[t]he plaintiff 
experienced, even momentarily, a lapse in, or failure of, dignified bearing, and this was as a 
direct result of the degrading performed in (1) and (2),” such as by “severe[ly] blushing, 
physically shaking or trembling, [tearing up], flying into a rage, running away, cowering, 
clamming up, turning pale, profuse[ly] sweating,” or otherwise losing their “psychological 
or physiological self-control and self-possession.”  Id. at 29–36. 
 163  To satisfy the test for humiliation, the plaintiff must satisfy the requirements for 
degradation plus two additional elements: (5) “[t]he defendant not merely degraded the 
plaintiff in the manner described in (1) and (2) but also did so in public or as a public event, 
and with the intention to humiliate the plaintiff,” where public means simply “within sight 
or hearing of . . . at least one other person in addition to the defendant and plaintiff”; and (6) 
“[t]he plaintiff had a feeling or sense of being humiliated, over and above any sense of being 
degraded involved in (3), and this was a direct result of the public degrading performed in 
(5).”  Id. at 37–39.  Brown notes “[f]eeling humiliated is a complex dysphoria that typically 
manifests itself in intense discomfort arising from the consciousness that one is being made 
low in front of others . . . . [and] the feeling of being humiliated is akin to but not the same 
as feelings of embarrassment. A person can be made to feel embarrassed without necessarily 
feeling humiliated.  Embarrassment is a feeling of self-consciousness or unease, often in 
socially awkward situations, arising from one’s awareness that one has done or said 
something inappropriate.  Humiliation involves a sense of public debasement, that one’s 
basic worth or civic status has been ranked as inferior, challenged, or denied in front of 
others.”  Id. at 38–39. 
 164  See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Retheorizing Actions for Targeted Hate 
Speech: A Comment on Professor Brown, 9 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 169, 172–74 (2018); 
Steven J. Heyman, When is Hate Speech Wrongful? A Comment on Alexander Brown’s 
Hate Speech As Degradation and Humiliation, 9 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 185, 186 (2018). 
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by targets of racism and ethnoviolence, particularly thick skin plaintiffs.  
Enter race-based traumatic stress.  Robert T. Carter expressly stated his 
intent in developing RBTS was to “offer[] [the model] as a way to break 
the stalled and blocked avenues of redress and relief for contemporary 
forms of racism (i.e., subtle, indirect) and racial justice.”165  He added that 
“in the forensic context, when the issues of complaints and legal claims 
enter the adversarial realm of the law, mental health and legal professionals 
need to be able to show the impact of the event on the person(s), given the 
person’s history and background,” and his evidence “shows that racism and 
discrimination can be physically, psychologically, and emotionally harmful 
to their targets both as stress and as trauma.”166  Some professionals have 
expressed cautious optimism RBTS has potential as an alternative to PTSD 
when evaluating psychological and emotional injuries resulting from 
racism in the forensic and counseling contexts.167  Unfortunately, to date, 
RBTS has never been cited in any case in any jurisdiction,168 and the only 
legal scholarship to discuss RBTS was in fact authored by Carter.169 
RBTS sits in a unique position of blending clinical and empirical 
scholarship to provide the legal community a means of assessing a very 
particularized injury so that—rather than trying to fit a square peg in a 
round hole with standard DSM diagnoses that mental health professionals 
agree are patently inapposite to racism and ethnoviolence—the law can use 
a metric pointedly designed for that square peg.  Historically, the law has 
favored DSM diagnoses almost exclusively as injuries due to fear of 
 
 165  Carter, supra note 92, at 148. 
 166  Carter, supra note 92, at 149–50. 
 167  See, e.g., Thema Bryant-Davis, Healing Requires Recognition: The Case for Race-
Based Traumatic Stress, 35 COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 135, 137 (2007) (making the case 
that racist incidents—even non-physical ones—can produce trauma which should be 
formally recognized as an independent traumatic or stress-related disorder); Carter & 
Forsyth, supra note 90, at 36–37 (“Since the law does not require a DSM diagnosis to show 
evidence of injury and because the DSM does not currently consider the racial or social 
context of stressors that cause psychological injury, we recommend that psychiatrists 
expand their perspectives beyond the DSM,” such as through RBTS theory); Lillian Comas-
Díaz, Racial Trauma Recovery: A Race-Informed Therapeutic Approach to Racial Wounds, 
in THE COST OF RACISM FOR PEOPLE OF COLOR supra note 69, at 249 (outlining a proposed 
means of using RBTS to understand and treat the “insidious trauma” of racism and racial 
microaggressions); Ezra E. H. Griffith, A Forensic and Ethics-Based View of Carter’s 
“Racism and Psychological and Emotional Injury,” 35 COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 116 
(2007) (noting the forensic application potential of RBTS); David R. Williams, Improving 
the Measurement of Self-Reported Racial Discrimination: Challenges and Opportunities, in 
THE COST OF RACISM FOR PEOPLE OF COLOR, supra note 69, at 55, 57–59 (suggesting RBTS 
can be used to classify the trauma of perceived discrimination).  
 168  A search in Lexis Nexis of “race-based traumatic stress” or “race-based stress” or 
“race-based trauma” or “RBTS” produced no results. 
 169  See Carter & Scheuermann, supra note 63 (discussing the utility of RBTS in 
workplace racial harassment claims). 
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frivolous or fraudulent lawsuits in which plaintiffs waste judicial resources 
and clog overfull dockets with spurious claims predicated on 
inconsequential, trivial inconveniences or entirely fabricated injuries.170  
Our understanding of mental health as a society has greatly evolved over 
the last several decades, however.  Substantial scholarship now exists to 
provide forensic psychologists and clinicians an empirically-driven 
framework to assess the veracity, or lack thereof, of a plaintiff’s 
nonpathological, non-DSM psychological and emotional harms without 
falling prey to either being duped by unscrupulous plaintiffs or denying 
bona fide plaintiffs relief due to overly-restrictive definitions.  To continue 
to rely on outmoded theories of mental injuries, originally founded on now-
obsolete concerns that we will otherwise be unable to validate the injury, is 
to deny genuinely injured plaintiffs legal redress.  Data shows injuries from 
racism run as deep as DSM trauma, but because of their non-lethal triggers, 
cumulative nature, and origin in everyday stressors, that injury does not 
manifest in a currently legally-recognized way.  That is a travesty of the 
very premise of tort law—making plaintiffs whole. 
This is not to argue for a lower injury standard but rather for a new 
conceptualization of equally genuine severe emotional distress from racism 
and ethnoviolence—one sensitive to the particular harms stemming from 
such phenomena, while not lessening the injury’s provability.  RBTS 
satisfies those requirements.  It has been well-received in the mental health 
community.  It has a clinically- and empirically-tested symptom scale by 
which experts can evaluate and attest to a plaintiff’s injuries.  And it does 
not invalidate the traumatic wounds of thick skin plaintiffs who experience 
so frequent racism that even outrageous incidents do not “disable” them. 
Finally, recall the primary impediment to many plaintiffs’ PTSD 
diagnoses is that the ethnoviolence they faced was not the right type of 
traumatic event (i.e., it was nonlethal).  But, IIED already accounts for the 
nature of a traumatic trigger in the “outrageousness” element, meaning 
PTSD inherently requires a higher outrageousness standard than the law 
does.  Comparatively, RBTS is not necessarily a “lesser” injury in the 
gravity of symptomology it requires, but it is more inclusive of injuries 
stemming from otherwise-legally-outrageous trauma.  Thus, RBTS 
provides plaintiffs an opportunity to, at the very least, have the merits of 
their claims heard rather than being summarily dismissed—as Ms. Turner 
was. 
 
 
 170  See supra text accompanying note 23. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The immediate pushback to tort reform proposals is often a floodgates 
concern, but incorporating RBTS into the IIED injury standard does not 
necessarily run those risks.  First, the outrageousness requirement—and, to 
a slightly more limited extent, the causation and intent requirements—will 
continue to operate as gatekeepers.  There will be no deluge of 
microaggression-based IIEDs, for instance, because they would almost 
universally fail the outrageousness requirement171 (and likely would not 
qualify as intentional or reckless).  Furthermore, the very premise of a 
deluge of litigation is unsubstantiated at best and farcical at worst: studies 
show that less than ten percent of all targets of racist incidents seek any 
help, be it from a “counselor, professor/teacher, psychologist, lawyer, 
religious leader, psychiatrist, medical doctor, social worker, or healer.”172  
Additionally, this proposed injury standard affects such a narrow subset of 
cases that a deluge is hardly even possible.  So the idea that not 
systematically disadvantaging plaintiffs of color in IIED suits will result in 
waves of new plaintiffs is, frankly, chimerical.  Consider also the practical 
concerns of litigation which would continue to act as barriers: attorneys are 
not cheap, the judicial system is not quick, and litigation is not simple or 
easy, not to mention potentially retraumatizing.  And institutionalized 
racism173 means these impediments operate as an even greater barrier for 
people of color. 
Essentially, this means if more new cases are brought because of this 
proposal, they will not be fraudulent or frivolous; they will be bona fide 
claims.  Expanding IIED’s injury standard to include RBTS as a form of 
severe emotional distress resulting from modern racism and 
ethnoviolence—to include a still empirically-validated but far more 
congruous measure—will not threaten a deluge of litigation.  But it will 
make justice more attainable for thick skin plaintiffs of color to recompense 
and vindicate affronts to their dignity. 
 
 
 171  See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 172  Robert T. Carter & Jessica Forsyth, Reactions to Racial Discrimination: Emotional 
Stress and Help-Seeking Behaviors, 2 PSYCHOL. TRAUMA 183, 188 (2010). 
 173  See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
